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By Lettie Mcspadden
Wenner. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1982. Pp. xii,

THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT.

256. $22.50.
The adoption, in 1970, of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 1 ushered in a new generation of important environmental legislation. 2 This legislation became the subject of intense litigation throughout
the 1970's, giving rise to a new body offederal law. 3 In her book The Environmental .Decade in Court, Lettie Wenner examines the patterns of environmental policy that emerged from the federal courts in the 1970's (p. 3).
Instead of highlighting "earthshaking decisions" or those producing "gems
of legal reasoning," Wenner seeks to "describe and analyze the mundane,
day-to-day workings of the federal courts" in environmental law. With this
description and analysis, Wenner attempts to explain and illuminate the
factors that have influenced the federal courts' decisions on the environment (p. 4).4
Toward this ambitious goal, Wenner examined 1900 cases decided during the 1970's by the federal district and circuit courts and by the Supreme
Court. These cases comprise virtually all of the reported environmental
cases in the federal judicial system (pp. 28, 193 n.12). In 1697 of these 1900
cases, Wenner assigned a number between one and five as a measure of the
court's degree of support for the environmental interest, with a score of one
representing a complete loss for the environment and a score of five representing a complete victory.
Having reduced each case to a number, Wenner categorized5 the cases
according to the type of environmental issue involved (pp. 95-96)6 and according to certain characteristics extrinsic to the cases themselves. These
extrinsic characteristics include the litigants involved (pp. 55-56, 62-63),7
which litigant initiated the case (pp. 56-58), and the region of the country in
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
2. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976)); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 74017642 (Supp. IV 1980)).
3. See generally W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1977).
4. An objective environmental interest is one in which the ecological balance is at issue.
Wenner contrasts this norm to the several cases in which environmental laws have been involved in attempts to maintain economic balances, such as where the relocation of a military
base is challenged. Pp. 193-94 & n.12.
5. Since the categories are not mutually exclusive, any given case may appear in several
categories.
6. The three categories of environmental cases are (1) state law, wildlife, and public trust
cases; (2) cases involving conflicts over air and water pollution control laws, and (3) disputes
over major federal public works, usually involving the National Environmental Policy Act.
Pp. 95-96.
7. Wenner categorized the litigants as environmentalists, industry, or the government.
Wenner further differentiated the litigants according to whether they had previously been involved in environmental litigation. Pp. 55-56, 62-63.
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which the litigation took place (p. 119). For each of these categories, Wenner calculated a mean environmental score8 indicating the extent to which
the courts supported the identified environmental interest. A mean score in
excess of three constitutes, on balance, judicial support for the environmental interests (p. 28).
For example, Wenner calculates that in water pollution cases generally,
the environment obtained a mean score of 3.34 from the courts (slightly
favorable). However, when environmentalists initiated claims for cleaner
water, they obtained a mean score of 2.39. Industry, presumably arguing
for less strict water pollution standards, obtained a mean score of 2.44. The
government, under attack from both the environmentalists and the industrialists, obtained a mean score in water pollution cases of 3.71 (p. 94).9 The
book for the most part consists of a parade of similar compilations. 10
Although Wenner's method of categorizing cases and quantifying their
results makes such compilations possible, reducing each case to a number
also prevents Wenner from examining certain other impacts the federal judiciary has had on environmental policy in the 1970s. The extent to which
a court vindicates or repudiates an objective environmental interest does
not fully assess the judiciary's impact on environmental policy. First, the
mean score for the cases in categories defined by a characteristic not intrinsic to the case itself11 is misleading because the mean is not related to any
single environmental interest or policy. The mean is derived from cases
involving different environmental issues; it is not a benchmark for a specified environmental policy. Although the number assigned to a particular
case may measure the extent to which the court vindicated the environmental claims made in that case, the number cannot precisely measure the comparative environmental impact of a group of cases. The demands of the
litigants vary significantly from case to case. 12 Because of this variance,
8. The mean score is obtained by dividing the sum of the scores of the cases in a given
category by the number of cases in that category. P. 28.
9. For each case in which it was involved, the litigant received a score on a scale from one
to five, equalling either the score for the environment on the case (for pro-environment litigants) or the difference between five and the score for the environment (for anti-environment
litigants). Pp. 55-56.
10. A few other conclusions are as follows:
(I) Support for the environment varied from circuit to circuit, with the circuits in the northcentral and northeastern regions of the country demonstrating the greatest support for the
environment, and the circuits in the West and South demonstrating the least. This same pattern of regional division on environmental issues emerged in the roll call votes in Congress in
the 1970s. P. 119.
(2) Regional disparities in support for environmental interests were less pronounced among
the appellate courts than among the trial courts. P. 144.
(3) The Supreme Court compiled, on balance, an antienvironmental record in the 1970s. P.
151.
I 1. See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
12. Wenner herself recognizes this problem of measurement:
If, however, it could be shown that the quality of the demands made by industry and
environmentalists shifted over time - the former, making more radical demands as the
political climate about the environment changed, and the latter, moderating their demands - the same level of judicial support for the environment could be interpreted as a
net loss for the environmental movement.
P. 32.
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Wenner's method cannot offer complete information on judicial influence
over environmental policy.
Another flaw with Wenner's method is its failure to weigh the significance of particular decisions. This failure masks the differing consequences
of individual decisions. For example, a landmark decision holding that the
Clean Air Act not only required cleanup in regions in which the levels of
pollutants exceeded the standards of the EPA, but also imposed requirements to prevent the degradation of clean airI 3 is arithmetically offset in
Wenner's system by the Ninth Circuit's holding that the Secretary of the
Interior was not required to write an environmental impact statement for
his refusal to prohibit the State of Alaska from hunting w~lves on federal
lands.I 4 Consequently, Wenner's conclusion that "U]udicial support for environmental values remained constant through the decade of the 1970s approximately fifty percent" (p. 34), although true in terms of Wenner's
method, may not fully capture the judiciary's impact on environmental policy. Is Wenner herself recognizes the limited value of such a claim:
"Whether a 50 percent victory level represented an outcome favorable or
unfavorable to the environment remains a matter of judgment."I 6 Thus,
although Wenner explores the role of the federal judiciary in shaping environmental policy, her book leaves unanswered important questions relating
to the issue.
The inherent incapability of Wenner's method to evaluate completely
the federal judiciary's impact on environmental policy becomes clear in the
final chapter, entitled "Do Courts Make a Difference?" In this chapter,
Wenner tepidly concludes that the courts have played an important role "in
helping to formulate, modify, and clarify environmental policy" (p. 169).
Just what those formulations, modifications, and clarifications have been
and what their effect has been remain unclear.I 7 Wenner answers affirmatively the question whether courts make a difference by concluding only
that the courts have been and will continue to be involved in making environmental policy (p. 177). Given this conclusion, anyone interested in what
difference the courts have made must tum to other literature. IS
The Environmental .Decade in Court attempts to categorize recognizable
trends in environmental litigation. It suffers the flaws inherent in numerical
13. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), ajfd sub nom. per
curiam by an equally divided Court, Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
14. See Alaska v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1979). This decision and that in Sierra
Club produce a mean score of 3, a neutral score for the environment.
15. Wenner admits that "[t]allying the policy outcomes in an won-lost manner makes the
issue seem overly simplistic." P. 34. See also p. 64.
16. P. 34. If the term "victory level" means the percentage of cases in which the environment obtained a score greater than three, a mean score of three does not equal a "victory level"
of50 percent, because, since the scale is from one to five, the environment could ''win" (obtain
a score of greater than three) in less than 50 percent of the cases and still obtain a mean score
of three.
17. Wenner does suggest that judicial involvement has enabled both industry and environmental groups to delay changes, both in the environmental law and the ecological status quo.
Pp. 172-74. Wenner concludes, however, that this delay is valuable because it provides additional time for "the political branches of government ••. to rethink their initial decisions." P.
174.
18. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 24-25 (1981).
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indexing of nonmathematical concepts. Nevertheless, the data presented
may be useful in a general sense. Wenner's book does provide insight into
potential judicial biases that may aid particular litigants and political actors. But it cannot provide the sole ground for accurate assessment of the
breadth, magnitude and direction of judicial policymaking in the environmental arena. The limits inherent in Wenner's analytic framework also
limit the scope of her success.

